Pashinian Says Snap Elections Possible if Parliament Blocks Constitution Change Tied to Azerbaijan Peace Deal
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian warned that he may call fresh parliamentary elections if he cannot secure the two-thirds parliamentary vote required to send a new constitution to referendum — a draft he says is needed to remove language that prevents a peace treaty with Azerbaijan. His Civil Contract party lacks the supermajority after disputed June 7 elections, and opposition groups in parliament have vowed to block the referendum, describing the change as dictated by Baku.
By Alexander Walter
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Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian said on Thursday that he could call snap parliamentary elections if he fails to win the two-thirds parliamentary majority needed to send a new constitution to referendum — a draft he says must be adopted to enable a peace treaty with Azerbaijan.
Pashinian’s comments followed continued opposition in the National Assembly to the as-yet-unpublished constitutional draft prepared by the Armenian Justice Ministry earlier this year. Under Armenian law, the constitution can be changed only by adopting a new text, and a referendum can proceed only after at least two-thirds of deputies approve the new draft. Pashinian’s Civil Contract party fell short of that supermajority in contested elections held on June 7.
Two opposition groups represented in the parliament have publicly vowed to block any attempt to advance the draft to referendum. They say the proposed change is being imposed by Baku and oppose altering the constitution in the manner sought. Pashinian said he would first try to persuade his opponents of the importance of the measure but added that other scenarios, including snap elections, remain on the table.
"We will try to convince our opposition colleagues that this is a very important issue," Pashinian told reporters. "If that doesn’t work, we will pursue other scenarios, including the possibility of holding snap elections. Who said that such a scenario is ruled out?"
Azerbaijan has made the signing of a peace treaty with Armenia conditional on amending the Armenian constitution. Specifically, Baku objects to the constitution’s preamble, which refers to Armenia’s 1990 declaration of independence; that declaration in turn cites a 1989 unification act adopted by the legislative bodies of Soviet Armenia and the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani officials view those references as illegitimate or as providing a legal-political basis for claims connected to Nagorno-Karabakh, and they have demanded their removal as a precondition for finalizing a bilateral peace deal.
Pashinian has publicly rejected the notion of allowing Azerbaijan to dictate Armenia’s internal law, but he has also pledged to craft constitutional changes that would be acceptable to Baku so the two countries can move forward with a treaty. The Armenian Justice Ministry prepared the draft constitution earlier in the year, but the text has not been published, and its precise contents remain undisclosed in the public domain.
The prime minister has stressed that his government is focused on completing the process of initialing and ratifying a peace treaty with Azerbaijan. He said he would concentrate on the “process of signing and ratifying the peace treaty initialed with Azerbaijan” on October 13, a few days after he and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met on the sidelines of an ex-Soviet summit in Turkmenistan. In the days that followed, Pashinian met with senior members of his Civil Contract party twice to discuss the way forward.
The standoff highlights a fraught intersection between Armenia’s domestic democratic procedures and the diplomatic push for a resolution to the conflict with Azerbaijan. If Pashinian cannot persuade opposition deputies to back the draft, a decision to call snap elections could reset the parliamentary arithmetic and offer his party another path to secure the supermajority required for constitutional change. Opposition lawmakers, however, portray any constitution-altering process tied to Baku’s demands as illegitimate, and their resistance suggests that any attempt to advance a new constitution could deepen political polarization in Armenia.
Observers warn that the outcome of this dispute will have significant implications for Armenia’s internal political stability and for the future of a formal peace treaty with Azerbaijan. A path that bypasses broad parliamentary consensus risks deep domestic backlash, while failure to secure the constitutional amendment could stall or derail formal normalization efforts conditioned on the removal of the disputed preamble language.