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Jul 18, 2026
Kurdish Strategy in the Peace Process: Öcalan’s Paradigm, Legal Deadlock and the Case for a ‘Root Law’
Following Abdullah Öcalan’s 2025 call and the PKK’s formal cessation of armed struggle, Turkey faces a stalled political transition in which competing visions over legal guarantees and sequencing threaten a durable settlement. The government is advancing a temporary 10-point "çerçeve yasa" that excludes Öcalan’s legal status, while the Kurdish movement insists on a comprehensive "kök yasa" that secures constitutional and cultural rights alongside disarmament.
By Seydîxan Bozkır
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Turkey’s fragile peace process between the state and the Kurdish movement has entered what many describe as a political “waiting room” — a crisis of sequencing and legal design that risks undoing recent steps toward ending decades of conflict. The dispute centers on whether cessation of armed activity should be treated as a precursor to far-reaching democratic reforms, or whether reforms must proceed in step with disarmament and verification on the ground.
The sequence of events that produced this impasse is stark. Abdullah Öcalan’s February 27, 2025 call set in motion a process that led, in May 2025, to the PKK declaring that it had dissolved itself and ended armed struggle. On July 11, 2025, weapons were publicly burned at Casenê Cave near Sulaymaniyah and forces announced their withdrawal beyond borders. In Turkey, months of parliamentary commission work under the TBMM umbrella produced reports, but the cessation of guns did not by itself unlock the legal and political changes demanded by the Kurdish movement.
From the government’s perspective the priority remains an approach tied to sovereignty and security. Statements from political leaders such as TBMM Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş indicate the administration favors a ten-point, provisional "çerçeve yasa" — a framework law conceived as temporary and limited. Critics within the Kurdish movement say that draft excludes the legal status of key leaders and, most importantly, Abdullah Öcalan, and therefore fails to address the fundamental legal protections they seek.
On the other side, the movement that replaced the dissolved PKK with a new Hareket Yönetimi has rejected such a limited template. Its position insists that the end of armed struggle must coincide with a comprehensive "kök yasa" — a root law that would guarantee local democracy, cultural rights, and create space for constitutional transformation. Movement leaders have repeatedly said that Öcalan’s status must be addressed as a first condition. During earlier talks the state asked for on-the-ground confirmation of disarmament first, while the movement proposed simultaneous democratic reform. With the battlefield verification phase largely completed, the current debate is now focused on the content and legal form of any law.
Understanding the bargaining positions requires an accurate reading of the movement’s power and vulnerabilities. The Kurdish political current today constitutes what can be described as Turkey’s third-largest political bloc: a resilient electoral base that has repeatedly won local offices, even after the appointment of trustees (kayyum) to replace elected mayors. Deep organisation in women’s and youth networks, diaspora ties and decades of cadre experience have made the movement a learning organisation capable of rapid sociopolitical adaptation. It has moved away from a classic state-building nationalist project and embraced a program centred on the democratic nation, ecology and women’s freedom, reshaping the Kurdish question into a broader social and political project that cannot be reduced to territorial claims alone.
Yet the movement faces acute structural weaknesses. The institutional environment created by the presidential system—marked by excessive centralisation, weakened judicial independence and the ease with which elected officials can be removed—impedes the transformation of electoral or social gains into secure, durable institutional power. Absent binding legal guarantees, municipal victories and social mobilisation remain exposed to executive intervention. The lack of a settled, enforceable legal principle is the core problem the movement seeks to solve with its demand for a "kök yasa".
Central to the Kurdish strategic reorientation is Abdullah Öcalan’s intellectual shift away from a secessionist framework toward a model he describes as a "democratic nation." His writings and, according to the movement, a July 2026 letter to Komînal, mark a decisive break in which the PKK’s historical mission is declared complete and the armed era ended. This paradigm decouples rights and status claims from territorial irredentism and seeks to place cultural, linguistic and communal self-governance within a constitutional and democratic framework. By removing the zero-sum logic of territory, Öcalan’s idea reduces the perceived existential threat to the state and reframes Kurdish claims as compatible with a unitary political order.
Still, the paradigm confronts hard limits. In a security-oriented state, mass societal organisation can be portrayed as a "paralel yapı," and opponents of reform will exploit real or imagined networks to stoke fear. Moreover, Kurdish society is not monolithic; internal class, religious and gender-based tensions require policies attentive to pluralism within the movement. The author argues that the strategic solution lies in a "Devlet + Demokrasi" formula that neither seeks to abolish the state nor leave society powerless: it would limit the state’s security monopoly while embedding robust legal protections for cultural, linguistic and local governance rights. Öcalan’s call for "cumhuriyete hukuk yoluyla katılım" is cited as an articulation of such an approach.
Ultimately, the article contends, the durability of any settlement will depend on converting Öcalan’s ideological "kirpi" core — a focused, principled vision — into practical, flexible "tilki" tactics across elections, parliaments, civil society, law and diplomacy. Without binding legal guarantees and adaptive political instruments, the asymmetry between the movement’s large goals and its more limited tools risks perpetuating instability rather than delivering a lasting peace.
The sequence of events that produced this impasse is stark. Abdullah Öcalan’s February 27, 2025 call set in motion a process that led, in May 2025, to the PKK declaring that it had dissolved itself and ended armed struggle. On July 11, 2025, weapons were publicly burned at Casenê Cave near Sulaymaniyah and forces announced their withdrawal beyond borders. In Turkey, months of parliamentary commission work under the TBMM umbrella produced reports, but the cessation of guns did not by itself unlock the legal and political changes demanded by the Kurdish movement.
From the government’s perspective the priority remains an approach tied to sovereignty and security. Statements from political leaders such as TBMM Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş indicate the administration favors a ten-point, provisional "çerçeve yasa" — a framework law conceived as temporary and limited. Critics within the Kurdish movement say that draft excludes the legal status of key leaders and, most importantly, Abdullah Öcalan, and therefore fails to address the fundamental legal protections they seek.
On the other side, the movement that replaced the dissolved PKK with a new Hareket Yönetimi has rejected such a limited template. Its position insists that the end of armed struggle must coincide with a comprehensive "kök yasa" — a root law that would guarantee local democracy, cultural rights, and create space for constitutional transformation. Movement leaders have repeatedly said that Öcalan’s status must be addressed as a first condition. During earlier talks the state asked for on-the-ground confirmation of disarmament first, while the movement proposed simultaneous democratic reform. With the battlefield verification phase largely completed, the current debate is now focused on the content and legal form of any law.
Understanding the bargaining positions requires an accurate reading of the movement’s power and vulnerabilities. The Kurdish political current today constitutes what can be described as Turkey’s third-largest political bloc: a resilient electoral base that has repeatedly won local offices, even after the appointment of trustees (kayyum) to replace elected mayors. Deep organisation in women’s and youth networks, diaspora ties and decades of cadre experience have made the movement a learning organisation capable of rapid sociopolitical adaptation. It has moved away from a classic state-building nationalist project and embraced a program centred on the democratic nation, ecology and women’s freedom, reshaping the Kurdish question into a broader social and political project that cannot be reduced to territorial claims alone.
Yet the movement faces acute structural weaknesses. The institutional environment created by the presidential system—marked by excessive centralisation, weakened judicial independence and the ease with which elected officials can be removed—impedes the transformation of electoral or social gains into secure, durable institutional power. Absent binding legal guarantees, municipal victories and social mobilisation remain exposed to executive intervention. The lack of a settled, enforceable legal principle is the core problem the movement seeks to solve with its demand for a "kök yasa".
Central to the Kurdish strategic reorientation is Abdullah Öcalan’s intellectual shift away from a secessionist framework toward a model he describes as a "democratic nation." His writings and, according to the movement, a July 2026 letter to Komînal, mark a decisive break in which the PKK’s historical mission is declared complete and the armed era ended. This paradigm decouples rights and status claims from territorial irredentism and seeks to place cultural, linguistic and communal self-governance within a constitutional and democratic framework. By removing the zero-sum logic of territory, Öcalan’s idea reduces the perceived existential threat to the state and reframes Kurdish claims as compatible with a unitary political order.
Still, the paradigm confronts hard limits. In a security-oriented state, mass societal organisation can be portrayed as a "paralel yapı," and opponents of reform will exploit real or imagined networks to stoke fear. Moreover, Kurdish society is not monolithic; internal class, religious and gender-based tensions require policies attentive to pluralism within the movement. The author argues that the strategic solution lies in a "Devlet + Demokrasi" formula that neither seeks to abolish the state nor leave society powerless: it would limit the state’s security monopoly while embedding robust legal protections for cultural, linguistic and local governance rights. Öcalan’s call for "cumhuriyete hukuk yoluyla katılım" is cited as an articulation of such an approach.
Ultimately, the article contends, the durability of any settlement will depend on converting Öcalan’s ideological "kirpi" core — a focused, principled vision — into practical, flexible "tilki" tactics across elections, parliaments, civil society, law and diplomacy. Without binding legal guarantees and adaptive political instruments, the asymmetry between the movement’s large goals and its more limited tools risks perpetuating instability rather than delivering a lasting peace.