Former Taiwanese Official: If Xi’s Coercion Fails, ‘The Military Attack Will Follow’ as China Builds Up Capability in 5 to 7 Years
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s plan is “to coerce Taiwan into submission”, and if that fails, “the military attack will follow,” I-Chung Lai, president of Prospect Foundation, told The Liberty Bulletin. He underscored Taipei's resolve to make the island “an indigestible obstacle for China,” and warned that Beijing has become “an economic threat” to Europe.
By Kristóf Ábel Tarnay
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Photo: Photograph: Political Capital/CEU, Budapest Forum
The global economy would lose about $10 trillion in the event of a war across Taiwan, according to estimates cited by I-Chung Lai, president of the government-affiliated think tank Prospect Foundation, who spoke to The Liberty Bulletin in an interview on the sidelines of the Budapest Forum conference at CEU in Hungary. Lai, who served from 2006 to 2008 as the Director General for the Department of China Affairs in the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), also noted that China and Russia cooperate in cognitive or information warfare. He called the argument that Asian values would be incompatible with democracy “nonsense.” He furthermore highlighted that Taiwan produces 90% of AI servers. The interview was conducted on 1 October 2026 and has been edited and condensed for clarity.
For a lot of European readers, Taiwan may seem an Asian issue, relatively far away from their everyday life. What economic and security concerns make security in the Taiwan Strait also a European issue?
If you look at Taiwan, not just its location, in terms of global shipping, our importance is similar to the Strait of Malacca. The Taiwan Strait carries about 21% of the whole trade in the whole world, the same number shared by the Strait of Malacca. We carry two times the trade than the Suez Canal, and three times more than the Panama Canal. So just look at all the chokepoints of the whole world in terms of the geolocation of Taiwan. Take away the geopolitical issues, simply in terms of global trade, we are that important. Not to mention the scientific capacity, Taiwan is also home to 97% of advanced chip production in the whole world, and about 65% of chip production generally. So we are the driver for the global high tech revolutions through our capability in semiconductors. And when we talk about AI development, Taiwan produces 90% of the whole world’s AI servers. A lot of people probably do not realise that, but if you want to really push forward for AI, whether those are data centers or calculation centers, Taiwan is an integral part in all of this. So that is another part about Taiwan's importance to the whole world.
And then there are the geopolitical issues. Taiwan is a connection between the Asian continent and the Western Pacific, and also the Northeast and Southeast Asia. It sits right in the center of the first island chain. So whoever owns Taiwan will change the whole geopolitical balance. First, the Indo-Pacific has a global relevance. So that's why geopolitically Taiwan occupies such an important place. If you look at the numbers about if the war should really happen across Taiwan, according to Bloomberg Economics, the global economic loss immediately will be about 10 trillion US dollars. That means that it would be 10 times higher than the 2008 financial tsunami, and about 5 times higher than the COVID in 2020. And the damage in comparison with the war in Ukraine and how that matters, we are a magnitude higher. So everyone will be affected.
How has China’s approach towards Taiwan changed since Xi Jinping came to power, and do you see Beijing’s current pressure campaign primarily as preparation for a military conflict, or as an attempt to achieve their political objectives without crossing that threshold?
I think everyone in Taiwan is very serious about Xi Jinping’s plan on Taiwan. We believe he wants to annex Taiwan during his time as the leader of China. We take that threat very seriously. And I think Xi Jinping’s plan is to coerce Taiwan into submission. If that fails, then the military attack will follow. So that's how we are preparing ourselves. First, we have to strengthen our domestic societal resilience, the people's will as well as our preparations. And then we also need to be ready should the war really happen so that we'll make Taiwan an indigestible obstacle for China. Whether that's the so-called scorpion strategy or the porcupine strategy, making it so difficult for China to swallow. Right now, China does not have the capability to launch a successful military invasion against Taiwan because they do not have enough sea lift or air lift capability to transport troops into Taiwan. Despite that, China has a significant number of ships and also jets that could harass and then threaten Taiwan. But they do not have the capability at this moment.
Do you think it needs to be expected that they will?
I think that when we look at the growth of their military, we expect that, probably not right now, but in 5 to 7 years, they might be able to have enough lift capabilities. But that also means that we have to continue to keep our defense capability ahead of their military buildup. So this is a race against time.
There are sometimes comparisons between China’s pressure on Taiwan and Russia’s hybrid warfare against Western countries. How useful do you think that comparison is? Given Taiwan’s extensive experience with disinformation, cyberattacks, economic pressure and other forms of grey-zone activity, what does Taiwan actually do differently, on a practical level, that European countries could learn from?
First of all, we have been under Chinese disinformation or cognitive warfare attacks very relentlessly for decades. Now probably in the last 50 or 60 years China has continued to attack Taiwan, whether that's physically or in the cognitive space. And we also do notice that the Chinese and the Russians, probably in the last 15 years, started to cooperate and at least exchange notes regarding how they conduct their cognitive or information warfare against their own targets. In the past, before the Chinese effort on social media, what China did to Taiwan was to use its proxies, whether they were businessmen closer to China or whatever Chinese economic capability they could have to lure Taiwan. That was the Chinese action on Taiwan, particularly from 2003 to 2010. At that time, the Chinese economy was booming very much. Everyone thought China was the opportunity for the future, so what China broadcasted to Taiwan at that time was that Taiwan has no future, China has a future, and you better join the Chinese family. They also bribed our politicians and local collaborators, including some of Taiwan's very big businessmen who were speaking on behalf of China.
But then the Russians came in, and what China learned from Russia is that it would be better and more economical for China to launch warfare on Taiwan not by boasting how good China is, but by boasting how democracy is bad. So they started to divide the whole society. But democracy actually emphasises diversity and people with different opinions. We have to respect them, and if everyone is the same, that's not good, it's better that everyone is different. So China amplified those differences and drove them into social polarisation, just like Russia did to the United States and many of Western democracies. That's what China also did to Taiwan. And then they also started to evolve from disinformation and fake information into something where they started to use AI to introduce messages that weren't really there, but exist in the social space.
When we encountered this fake information and disinformation, originally we thought that since it was fake, why didn't we just cite the facts to call the shots? But then we found out that it is not very efficient because for every lie we debunk, they create another 100 lies that are confronting us. So the next thing that we learned is that we need to at least establish our own presence in the social space. Although we do fact-checking to debunk the lies, we also need to amplify and let our stories be told, so that people at least know our stories, know where to resort to, and can fight their own little battles even in their own backyards. So that's how we are trying to do it. And we will continue our fight against this, but I think that it is still a work in progress. I'm not saying that we are very good at it, because Taiwanese local politics is very polarised as a result of the Chinese information campaign against Taiwan. So I'm not going to say we are very successful, but definitely we can exchange notes with our fellow democracies.
Hungary has become a major destination for Chinese investment, including CATL in Debrecen and BYD in Szeged, while the current administration led by PM Péter Magyar has adopted a somewhat more cautious approach compared to former PM Viktor Orbán, who was exceptionally close to Beijing, while still seeking pragmatic relations. Can Hungary successfully manage its relations with both Beijing and Taipei, and does Taiwan still see Hungary as a country where it can deepen relations?
Right after the Cold War ended, Hungary was one of the few places that opened up to Taiwan, so we established our office here. The treatment by the Hungarian government toward Taiwan at that time was very beneficial for both parties. But unfortunately, with the political developments in Hungary later, they started to view China probably as more than Taiwan. That resulted in the deterioration of Taiwan-Hungary interactions. This is a little bit unfortunate. Regarding the current government's approach toward China, I think that is the right one, particularly because for Hungary to really develop economically, China is not the answer.
As an example, I can share our experience, since Taiwan was also one of those countries earlier that engaged with China very extensively, particularly from 2008 to 2016. In my view, we also had a government just like your previous one, which was very pro-China. They kept telling people that we have to be nice to China so they will be nice to Taiwan, that China is the future, and that Taiwan cannot survive unless we are able to integrate economically more with China. But that did not result in real economic progress for Taiwan. During those eight years, our average economic growth was less than 2% every year. Then in 2016, Taiwan decided to change direction, just like the current Hungarian government. But if you compare the numbers between Taiwan and Hungary right now, I was told that the GDP per person in Taiwan is about twice as much as Hungary's. If you compare this number to probably 10 years ago, we were relatively the same, from what I understood. But 10 years ago, what Taiwan did was changing the course.
We wanted to reduce our economic footprint in China and diversify our economic outreach to other countries, particularly to the US, Japan, and Europe, to establish our independent economic growth. Then, after 10 years, right now Taiwan has a huge increase in economic growth, so we sort of doubled our per person income, but it seems that Hungary in those 10 years remained in the same place. So I would say that your current government's new approach is definitely the right one, based on the experience from Taiwan. Drifting away from China is definitely the right move. Particularly, China right now cannot offer any economic opportunity because the domestic economy in China is very bad.
They are relying on exports, which means they want to export everything to take away your market in order to compensate for the loss in their domestic economy. So right now, China has actually become a threat. With China becoming an economic threat to every country in Europe, what needs to be done is not just diversification but to reduce your economic interaction with China as fast as possible, because right now China is actually coming right at you. This is very different from 10 or 15 years ago. At that time, China still had a very potent domestic economy, was probably open to the market, and they were willing to invest. But right now, China is anything but that. They are going to export, and their expectations are that they will come in with a very low price into your own backyard, targeting your own industrial capabilities and your market, which is very concerning.
Hungary has traditionally heavily relied on German car manufacturing. But now, it also seems that due to the EU’s deadlines to phase out internal combustion engine cars, they have also invested in China-based EV factories like CATL and BYD. It seems like betting on both sides. Is it actually a trap?
Basically every single one of Germany’s carmakers is facing a dramatic loss of market share and shrinking profit margins in China. They're also losing money here due to the exportation of Chinese EV cars like BYD and whatever comes in. Their price is like 30% of the German cars. So how could a German car fight against this invasion, even in their own backyard? The way China was able to do that is through state subsidies for every single car they export. If you look at the retail price, it is lower than the cost. They're selling things under cost in order to wipe out their opponents and they are trying to occupy the whole market so that later on they can increase the price as much as they will, because no one will be able to compete against them. That's what Germany is facing right now. Around this October, there are discussions and increasing voices about limiting Chinese EVs as well as other Chinese export products into the European Union. I think that is the trend happening right now. Hungary, in my view, also needs to take a serious look at this development. So I do not think Germany is playing a double game, having things here and also investing in China. The German cars in China have been wiped out by Chinese domestic brands, and right now their own backyards are also facing an invasion by Chinese cars. They are losing in both ways.
What about Hungary?
My recommendation is to just reduce your economic engagement with China as much as possible, and increase your engagement first with the European Union. Try to consolidate the share that you have, but also try to cultivate other markets. Right now, if you look at the economic growth of the whole world, first of all, Southeast Asia continues to register very strong growth.
Last year, Taiwan's GDP grew by 8.76%, and this year we're on track to register about 11.05%, according to the official forecast by Taiwan's Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics from August, which is, in our view, very shocking, although pleasantly shocking. That means our momentum right now is up, and there are tremendous potentials I believe Hungary could utilise regarding what is happening in Taiwan. You also need to look at India, and the United States continues to be a very strong economy overall, despite what President Trump did.
The Chinese state subsidies you mentioned pose a dilemma, especially regarding public procurement procedures. If there are concerns, such as about Chinese contractors building mobile infrastructure, is it justified to choose a more expensive contractor instead?
I know that in the past, Hungary, probably due to the previous government, has been too close to China, and it is very difficult and probably very costly to veer off. But the European Union's economic cooperation will provide not just significant relief, but also opportunities, because the European Union is also in a phase of economic transformation for the future. I believe that Hungary needs to jump on that train; you cannot miss it. So this is going to be a very important factor for you to consider. The issue right now is exactly about how fast you can veer off from China. There are some people who suggest being prudent and doing a gradual phase-out. But right now, I seriously doubt if time is on your side about this approach. First of all, Chinese economic conditions are worsening very fast. I'm not going to say China will experience a Soviet-style collapse like during the late '80s, but the Chinese economy’s whole balloon is deflating fast. If you continue to maintain a certain engagement with China, you will find that you are not going to get any benefit, but at the same time you are giving yourself up while China continues to suck your resources, which, in terms of cost-benefit analysis, is going to be costly in every way. Although I know it's a difficult task, the determination needs to be made very clear right from the outset. I believe Hungary could have a much better alternative by phasing out China a little bit faster.
Taiwan has a very distinctive historical experience and a distinct Taiwanese identity. Does this complicate the idea that Taiwan is evidence that Chinese or Confucian cultural traditions are compatible with liberal democracy?
Our story and how Taiwan transformed into a democracy mean that democracy is a universal value. It is not limited to a certain culture, as the Communist Party always likes to argue, or the way former Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew talked about Asian values being incompatible with democracy, which, in my view, is nonsense, because we live through it. So I'm not going to say whether Confucian culture is compatible with democracy or not. Rather, it is a question of human nature, and whether democracy is a universal value. I believe it is. The Chinese government continues to resist that, and they even try to push through their Global Governance Initiative to delegitimise democracy and legitimise their dictatorship, which is pathetic in my view.
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry has become even more strategically important because of the global AI boom. With Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company increasingly expanding advanced manufacturing capacity outside Taiwan, including in Arizona and Dresden, does this weaken the so-called “silicon shield”, or could Taiwan’s semiconductor ecosystem remain strategically indispensable?
No, we do not consider that as a weakening of the so-called “silicon shield” or the presence of Taiwan. TSMC is already a global company that needs to expand. They cannot just rely on Taiwan and do business with the whole world. Taiwan is a small island; we are much smaller than Hungary. So they need to expand. Kumamoto, Phoenix in Arizona, and Dresden are the locations right now. But I believe that TSMC will continue to grow and expand. They will continue to invest in other places. Ironically, the first location of TSMC's overseas investment was China. In 2004 and 2016, both times, the TSMC investment decision was more about defeating local competitors. You have to go local and defeat them right in their own backyard in order to ensure your global dominance. And they were able to do that in China, deterring Chinese semiconductor capabilities for decades at least. Later on, China started to outspend TSMC in everything, but all they can do is legacy chips, not advanced chips, which are still dominated by TSMC. So this episode tells us that we never consider TSMC's overseas investment as a weakening of Taiwan's global semiconductor dominance. We believe it is complementary and a critical development for TSMC, and also for other companies, to expand.
How does the Taiwanese strategic community assess the long-term reliability of the United States as Taiwan’s main security partner? What is Taiwan doing differently in response to any uncertainty about the long-term nature of American commitments under Donald Trump?
In Taiwan, we have dealt with both of his administrations, and the first Trump administration was actually the one that transformed US policy in very fundamental and positive ways. Before that, Taiwan had always been relegated by the United States policy community as an afterthought, so we really appreciate the first Trump administration for the watershed moment it created in the improvement of Taiwan-US relations. That trajectory continued in the Biden administration. During the second Trump administration, President Trump's statements caused some people's concern. But when we look at the reality of what is actually on the ground, we do see continued development. The trend is still very positive.
Although some people argue that currently the engagement between Trump and Xi has resulted in delaying the arms sale package to Taiwan, if you just take away the current package, the first one the Trump administration sold to Taiwan already outnumbered the four-year combination of the Biden administration. So it is actually the biggest we have ever received. Also, Taiwan-US military, economic, and technological cooperation is actually at unprecedented levels. Taiwan also enjoys very strong bipartisan support in Congress. So everything on the ground and in the structure is very sound in terms of Taiwan-US relations. That is not going to be shaken by whoever the president is, talking about US-Taiwan relations.
If you look at both Trump–Xi meetings, the one in Beijing or the one just concluded in Washington, President Trump actually kept a very strong discipline about what should be said about Taiwan. He never said yes to Xi Jinping when he tried to pressure him to oppose Taiwanese independence or not to sell arms to Taiwan. He never admitted or accepted those demands. He continued to do what he wanted to do, although he talked about how good Xi Jinping is and how the relationship between them is the best, but we do not see that this has come at the expense of US-Taiwan relations.
For many Asian countries, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, Japan and the Philippines, for example, we are all in the first island chain under the threat of China. Therefore, both Japan and the Philippines, along with Taiwan, continue to invest very strongly in bilateral relations with the United States. We continue to believe that Taiwan's, Japan's, and the Philippines' relations with the US are on a very strong footing. Probably the perception and the way we are doing things are a little bit different from our European friends. We share the concerns, but right now we do not see any deviation in terms of the bilateral relationships. And we do believe that the US continues to be the biggest and strongest security and now also economic guarantor for the well-being of these three countries, including Taiwan.