"Even Modest Cooperation Challenges Russia's Ambitions": NATO's Role in Central Asia and the Risks of Curtailment
The New York Times recently reported that Moscow is pressing NATO to halt any military activity in Central Asia, raising alarms about the future of security partnerships for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Retired Major General Vakhtang Kapanadze, former Georgian chief of staff and Georgia's ex-representative to NATO and the EU, warns that while NATO engagement in the region is limited militarily, cutting it off would inflict long-term institutional and geopolitical damage and narrow the strategic choices of these countries.
By Christopher Manley
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Recent reporting by the New York Times suggesting that Russia has urged the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to end any military activity in Central Asia has prompted renewed scrutiny of Moscow’s efforts to limit its neighbors’ ties with Western security institutions. The English service of RFE/RL sought the assessment of retired Major General Vakhtang Kapanadze — a former Georgian chief of the general staff and Georgia’s military representative to NATO and the European Union — about whether Russia is seeking to isolate post‑Soviet states from NATO and what the broader implications might be for regional security.
Kapanadze, a doctor of military sciences who trained at the U.S. Army War College and served twice as Georgia’s chief of staff, said the practical NATO footprint in Central Asia and the South Caucasus is modest in strictly military terms but strategically consequential. He emphasized that NATO does not currently maintain a significant permanent force presence or large military infrastructure in these regions. Yet even limited cooperation — training programs, professional military education, interoperability exercises and targeted capacity-building — helps diversify security ties, raises professional standards, and strengthens ties with the West in ways that gradually diminish Moscow’s traditional dominance.
"What worries Russia is not so much NATO’s present military posture as the long-term geopolitical effect," Kapanadze said. "Even modest cooperation challenges Russia’s ambitions to preserve a sphere of influence in its immediate neighborhood." He pointed to the Black Sea as an illustration of how regional balances can shift over time: once effectively a Soviet lake, the Black Sea’s strategic environment has changed dramatically since the Cold War, and Moscow’s relative dominance there has been eroded.
From an operational perspective, Kapanadze argued, NATO programs matter because they improve military professionalism, interoperability with Western forces, crisis management skills, cyberdefense, and institutional resilience. In the South Caucasus, Georgia has benefited across a range of areas including cyber security, special operations training, military education and joint training. In Central Asia the pattern is less uniform, but access to NATO expertise, training and defense reform assistance helps these countries broaden their options and avoid sole reliance on a single patron.
Suspending such programs would not immediately alter the material balance of military power in the region, Kapanadze said, but the damage would be real and primarily institutional and geopolitical. Countries would lose opportunities for professional development, modern defence planning and interoperability with a wider set of partners — losses that would accumulate over years. That would narrow strategic choice, increase dependence on existing security partners (primarily Russia), and create openings for other actors, notably China, to expand influence. He noted that closer cooperation between Iran and Russia further complicates the strategic landscape.
Kapanadze also warned of the diplomatic risk that questions of post‑Soviet security could be negotiated by great powers without meaningful participation of the countries directly affected. Historical examples, he suggested, show the dangers of sidelining small states when great‑power bargaining is under way: perceived weaknesses or indecisiveness in Western responses to earlier Russian actions — notably in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine after 2014 — helped shape Moscow’s calculations and ultimately contributed to the 2022 full‑scale invasion of Ukraine.
At the same time, Kapanadze acknowledged that NATO has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to the sovereignty of states and their right to choose security arrangements. He pointed to NATO’s 2022 strategic concept and the 2026 Ankara declaration as formal attestations of that principle. Yet he cautioned that such commitments must be backed by political unity among NATO members — especially between the United States and its European allies. If Washington signals a willingness to compromise on partners’ rights, other allies could come under pressure to accept limits on NATO’s regional engagement, with consequences for the alliance’s ability to project stability beyond its borders.
Kapanadze concluded that any negotiations about security in regions such as the South Caucasus, the Black Sea, or Central Asia must include the countries that would be affected and respect their sovereign choices. Otherwise, he warned, agreements reached without their consent risk treating them as bargaining chips and narrowing the space for independent policy. He summed up with a reminder attributed to a prominent statesman: "Russia is never as strong as it looks, nor as weak as it seems," underscoring the need for careful but principled policy by NATO and its members.
The debate over NATO’s presence in Central Asia highlights the intersection of military cooperation and political sovereignty. Whether modest NATO programs there will be preserved or curtailed will have consequences not only for immediate defense capabilities but also for the long‑term strategic autonomy and institutional development of the region’s states, and for the broader balance of influence between Moscow, Beijing, Washington and regional capitals.