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News Oct 1, 2026

Countering Hybrid Warfare: Poland’s New Centralized Anti-Disinformation Hub

As Poland moves to treat Russian and Belarusian disinformation as a national security crisis, its push for a centralized anti-disinformation hub runs into a democratic paradox: defending the information space without tipping into state censorship.

By Paweł Cybulski 823 views
Countering Hybrid Warfare: Poland’s New Centralized Anti-Disinformation Hub
As hybrid threats intensify along NATO’s Eastern Flank, Poland finds itself at the epicenter of an aggressive, multi-front information war. Deception campaigns engineered by foreign state actors—primarily Russia and Belarus —are no longer viewed in Warsaw as mere propaganda, but as a systemic national security crisis.

According to the landmark report "Disinformation Through the Eyes of Poles 2026" published by the Digital Poland Foundation, 77% of Polish citizens report encountering disinformation, while 75% classify it as a severe threat to the state. Most strikingly, 47% of respondents now equate foreign influence operations directly to traditional armed aggression.

Despite the scale of the threat, Poland’s effort to mount a centralized defense highlights a fundamental friction at the heart of modern democracies: the delicate balance between safeguarding the information space and preserving freedom of speech.


A Fragmented Public and the Democratic Paradox

Foreign influence campaigns operating in Poland rarely rely on isolated fake news stories. Instead, adversary networks exploit existing domestic political fault lines, deploying mass-scale narratives designed to weaponize social fatigue. Key vectors include driving wedges between Polish citizens and Ukrainian refugees, undermining trust in NATO commitments, and cultivating a sense of military helplessness—often framed by threats of Russian missile escalation alongside contradictory "peace" messaging designed to weaken regional resolve.

This persistent pressure has created a sharp paradox within Polish public opinion.

On one hand, citizens are demanding decisive state and corporate intervention. The Digital Poland study reveals that 64% of Poles expect digital platforms to actively moderate false content, while 57% openly support government-enforced restrictions against disinformation creators.

On the other hand, deep-seated fears of state overreach and censorship persist. Nearly half of the population (45%) believes current platform moderation already goes too far, leading to arbitrary suppression of debate. Furthermore, 40% of citizens adamantly defend free expression, maintaining that speech must remain unrestricted even if it permits the spread of false information online.

This environment leaves Polish policymakers walking a high-wire act: constructing a robust defense against cognitive warfare without alienating a population sensitive to state control over information.


The Institutional Architecture: Advisory Teams and Opaque Lists

To address these vulnerabilities, the Polish government has initiated a two-pronged institutional apparatus spanning the Prime Minister’s Office (KPRM) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSZ).

At the domestic level, the government established the Expert Advisory Team for Information Security of the Republic of Poland, operating under the National Security Department of the KPRM. Colloquially dubbed the "government information security council," the body held its inaugural meeting on April 18, 2026. Led by media scholar Dr. Katarzyna Bąkowicz, the team serves as an advisory mechanism rather than a statutory state agency.

However, the initiative has drawn scrutiny over administrative transparency. The Prime Minister’s Office has cited "dozens" of participating academics, civil servants, and security analysts, but has refrained from publishing a complete public roster. Verified academic figures involved include Prof. Adam R. Bartnicki and Dr. Justyna Olędzka (University of Białystok), Prof. Agnieszka Demczuk and Prof. Agnieszka Szuster-Ciesielska (UMCS Lublin), Dr. Agnieszka Bryc and Prof. Maria Wincławska (UMK Toruń), Prof. Szymon Ossowski (UAM Poznań), and Ewa Polak (PCPM).

Parallel to the KPRM’s domestic focus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Consultative Council on Resilience to International Disinformation (formalized under MSZ Order No. 30 on September 11, 2024). Chaired by veteran diplomat Tomasz Chłoń alongside deputy chair Katarzyna Szaran, this council brings state authorities together with civil society groups, tech federations, and investigative outlets.

Members of the MSZ Consultative Council include representatives from key institutions:
● Fact-checking & Media Analysis: Demagog Association (Marcel Kiełtyka), INFO OPS Poland Foundation (Maksym Sijer), Zamenhof Institute (Paweł Prus), and Kybernetes Institute (Mariusz Żabiński).
● Industry & Digital Publishers: Lewiatan Confederation (Karolina Czwarno-Kos, Witold Drożdż, Krzysztof Malesa, Małgorzata Zakrzewska), Digital Publishers Association (Maciej Kossowski), Polish Chamber of Information Technology and Telecommunications (Andrzej Dulka), and Agora S.A. (Paweł Czajkowski).
● Academia & Think Tanks: Casimir Pulaski Foundation (Wojciech Dzięgiel), Center for International Relations (Agnieszka Ostrowska), Center for Contemporary Security Environment Research (Michał Marek), Polish Academy of Sciences (Anna Rzepa), and Łukasiewicz Research Network – PORT (Grzegorz Rzeczkowski).


The REINFO Congress: A Blueprint for a Centralized Hub

Despite the establishment of these advisory bodies, anti-disinformation experts argue that Poland’s operational response remains fractured across isolated silos—with government ministries, non-governmental organizations, newsrooms, and academic centers frequently operating on divergent timelines and priorities.

To bridge these gaps, the Consultative Council backed the creation of the REINFO Congress, an international academic and security summit held on September 22–23, 2026, at the University of Białystok.

Gathering more than 50 frontline analysts and public policy specialists from across Europe, the congress focused on six core pillars:
1. Influence operations as an instrument of hybrid warfare.
2. Building local and municipal information resilience.
3. European legal frameworks, specifically the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA).
4. Information security during electoral cycles and acute regional crises.
5. Algorithmic distribution dynamics on major digital platforms.
6. Public media literacy and societal cognitive defense.

The primary outcome of the REINFO Congress was a comprehensive policy report delivering a clear directive to Warsaw: Poland urgently requires a single, centralized anti-disinformation hub.

The proposed hub would act as an operational bridge between public administration, military intelligence, fact-checking networks, and private tech platforms. Rather than creating another advisory panel, the report advocates for a permanent command structure capable of real-time threat detection, rapid cross-sector communication, and coordinated counter-messaging.

Organizers have confirmed that REINFO will become a recurring summit, with at least three editions planned. Whether Polish lawmakers will act on the congress's core recommendation and formalize a unified national defense body remains an open question—and one that will determine how effectively NATO's easternmost frontline state withstands the next wave of hybrid aggression.

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